For once, the Russian businessman Evguéni Prigojine, founder of the Wagner mercenary group and reputed to be close to Vladimir Putin, boasted on Monday of carrying out manipulation operations in the middle of the campaign for the mid-term elections. -mandate in the United States, after years of denials.
“The battle of narratives continues, not only in the West, but also in Latin America and Africa where the Kremlin is very effective in spreading its narratives and its propaganda”, explains to AFP Katarina Klingova, researcher for the think. -Globsec tank, based in Bratislava.
In Europe, the Belgian NGO EU DisinfoLab, specializing in the fight against disinformation, reported in mid-September a very sophisticated influence operation – launched in May 2022 and still ongoing – consisting in creating dozens of clone sites of authentic media (including Bild, 20minutes, Ansa, The Guardian or RBC Ukraine) with a view to disseminating fake articles, videos and polls.
All relayed by “networks of pages or fake Facebook accounts”, and an advertising campaign on the social network for an amount of around 105,000 dollars, says the NGO.
– Bypass –
While it remains difficult to attribute this operation to a particular actor, “a lot of elements point in the direction of the involvement of actors based in Russia”, affirms EU DisinfoLab, describing narrations all “aligned with Russian propaganda “.
At the beginning of July, a spokeswoman for the Bulgarian government for her part accused Russia of paying up to 2,000 euros per month to public figures, politicians or journalists, to defend the interests of the Kremlin in the country.
As early as March, the European Union banned the media RT and Sputnik, without succeeding in preventing them from broadcasting content. To this end, they play with the interstices of the Internet: creation of new domain names, mirror sites or seemingly independent sites, reproducing word for word RT content, as recently noted by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, established in London.
They also remain accessible via a simple VPN (virtual private network) or on online video platforms, such as Odysee or Rumble, where the assumed absence of moderation gives pride of place to conspiracy theories, radical and anti-system .
Recently reported to the French authorities, which had clearly escaped this circumvention, Odysee and Rumble ceased to broadcast the content of RT and Sputnik in France at the end of October. But elsewhere in Europe, the spread continues, AFP noted.
These two media are “just the tip of the iceberg. There are a plethora of tools and actors used by the Kremlin in its influence operations – from its vast media machine to news agencies, embassies and its representatives around the world, troll factories, hackers, the Orthodox Church, various NGOs, etc.”, details Katarina Klingova.
– To sow confusion –
“Since the beginning of the Russian invasion in Ukraine and the blocking of RT? and Sputnik, there has been a recomposition of the information tool and of Russian influence abroad” around in particular a large galaxy of Telegram channels , blogs, Twitter accounts, Facebook and others, explains to AFP Kevin Limonier, researcher on Russian-speaking cyberspace.
“This blockage also came too late. These media have succeeded in creating extremely complex networks for the dissemination of narratives that no longer necessarily depend on the Russian state. Russian influence has become commonplace and rooted, particularly within ‘a certain number of anti-system circles, yellow vests, anti-vaccines, etc…’.
For a long time, the strategy “consists of creating confusion by mixing the true and the false, by not hesitating to disguise reality and by creating simple explanations for complex problems”, he adds.
It also aims to stir up tensions and weaknesses. Some observers thus anticipate information campaigns around the themes of energy and heating as winter approaches, which could put a strain on European support for Ukraine in the event of food rationing. ‘electricity.
“The informational weapon remains a low-cost tool, compared to conventional weapons, and can have a potentially strong impact. For example in the context of elections, if you are able to influence political leaders potentially willing to stop the ‘aid to Ukraine’, points to AFP Brian Liston, analyst at Recorded Future, an American company specializing in cybersecurity.
