Muscovites are getting used to it. Early this Saturday, August 26 in the morning, the mayor of the Russian capital, Sergei Sobyanin, indicated that the air defense had shot down a drone which approached the city during the night. Since the beginning of the year, drone attacks have multiplied on Russian and annexed territories. But since the beginning of August, Moscow has been intensely targeted. On Wednesday August 23, the capital recorded six attacks in six days.
Attacks in the Belgorod region, Krasnodar, Bryansk, or in the Crimea, are logical: they are directly part of the framework of operations. In these areas, Ukrainian drones target strategic sites, such as oil or ammunition depots, military airports or command centers. But in Moscow, prowling ammunition mainly targets the Novo-Ogariovo district, that of business and elites, without ever causing great damage.
The objective is probably fourfold, underlines Joseph Henrotin, editor-in-chief of the journal Defense and International Security and research fellow at the Center for Analysis and Forecasting of International Risks. Ukraine first sends a message to its people, proving that it is capable of “strike at the heart of Russia”, while its counter-offensive has stalled for several weeks. But also to Western chancelleries, by “demonstrating that hitting Russia does not lead to a nuclear reaction, thus promoting the donation of long-range equipment”.
In addition, kyiv is trying to make an impression and psychologically destabilize the Russian city population, “by proving to them that war is not a distant affair”. So far, the drones have officially caused only a few injuries. But they can instill fear in the minds of Muscovites. Finally, these strikes make it possible to put the Russian general staff under political pressure, by forcing them to “stop the attacks”, and operational, “by imposing the withdrawal of equipment present in Ukraine”.
The operational challenge is actually less. It is not excluded that military offices were targeted in the business district of Moscow. But these drone strikes play a more symbolic than truly operational role. However, “hitting at the heart, even symbolically, produces effects on political, military and civilian perceptions, and can therefore have a strategic impact”, underlines Joseph Henrotin.
One question remains unanswered: that of timing. Ukraine did not wait for the summer to strike in Russian or occupied territory. But the recent multiplication of attacks against Moscow raises questions. “They intervene de facto at a crucial moment for the Ukrainian counter-offensive”, breathes the editor-in-chief of DSI. Is this a way to divert attention, to create a diversion? The future will tell. But this increase in the number of attacks on Moscow more simply reflects the fact that Ukraine has the means and benefits from it.
At the start of the war, neither Ukraine nor Russia were really equipped with drones. Moscow has appealed to Iran to provide it with its Shahed-136 suicide drones. For its part, Ukraine was quickly able to count on the Turkish Bayraktar TB2. Above all, it now produces its own drones, thanks in particular to the fundraising campaign of a young Ukrainian influencer. With some efficiency: Between May and July 2023, Ukraine flew more prowl munitions to Russia than in all of 2022, according to the New York Times. The American daily has also identified three kinds of long-range drones manufactured in Ukraine and used during the attacks against Moscow.
One of them is nicknamed “Beaver”. It has a range of about 1000 km, which allows it to be fired from Ukrainian territory – Moscow is only 450 km as the crow flies from the nearest Ukrainian border. Other shorter-range drones are to be launched from Russian territory, by Ukrainian sympathizers or small commandos, notes the New York Times. The “Beaver” can carry “an explosive charge of around 20 kg, judge Joseph Henrotin. Too little to really cause damage, but enough to be visible”. This seems to validate the thesis of above all symbolic strikes.
