The Royal Academy of economics and Finance has just published with accurate punctuality and it is assumed that it is not by chance, in view of the conclusions of the Commission of Inquiry of the Congress of Deputies on the financial crisis, the work of Spanish Savings banks. Chronic of sudden death from Juan Ramón Quintás Seoane , academic, corresponding to Galicia of the institution. The report of the president of the Spanish Confederation of Savings banks (CECA) between 2002 and 2010, and director general for the previous eight years dissects the evolution of the sector, especially during the crisis, and the “paradigm shift” that resulted in the rapid disappearance of the entities after almost two centuries of history.

The professor gallego, not happy with the impact that had its intervention in the above-mentioned commission in October 2017, which did not leave puppet head-on, re-launch mandadobles right and left: from the bad practices of the boxes up to the problems of governance, through the responsibilities of the Governments (central and autonomic) and the Bank of Spain.

For Quintás there is a background cause in the onset of the crisis of the boxes (“the inoculation of the politicization by LORCA [Law of the Governing Bodies of the Cajas Savings], the colonization of boxes by politicians develops rapidly since then, thanks to the development by the autonomous communities of the statutes of autonomy”) and a proximate cause (“bad corporate governance practices of many boxes, arising in good part of the colonization policy, and stimulated not a few times by the remarkable activism of real estate developers and other entrepreneurs regional”).

“The reform is a case of arbitrariness in the used bad practices as a pretext to”

Then stood in the center of the blame, as “cooperators” of the gestation and evolution of the crisis, regulators and supervisors of the successive governments of Spain and of the autonomous communities, “thanks to the bad practices, errors of strategy and, very especially, in reason of its lethal delays in the implementation of the appropriate corrective measures that allow the survival of the sector”. In some cases, “acts declared criminal by the courts, unfortunately, have been observed over the past few years in the conduct of boxes, regulators and supervisors”. And, as an adjuvant, “a global economic crisis duration, evolution and intensity of exceptional quality that acted as a trigger and catalyst of the entire process”.

Around all of this is supported by an allegation Youwin of the that saves very few. Quintás, that was bad body of the ECSC because it was very consistent with what was baked inside and outside of the institution, is bleeding from the wound. For him, the policies on the sector undertaken by the regional governments and the central Government not helped the sector, or staked firmly to its continuity by appealing to often and sometimes free of charge to european guidelines.

“was Not diligent the Government is in the interaction with the Bank of Spain in terms of the design and implementation of appropriate measures to prevent the risks of insolvency that threatened the industry,” says the professor, adding that “proof of this was his total disregard of the alarming content of the famous letter that in may of 2006 directed the inspectors of the Bank of Spain the minister of Economy.

“The regional Governments were pushed to waive loans to the political parties,”

In his opinion, “the reform of Spanish is a clear case of arbitrariness, in that the bad practices of the managers to take advantage of as a pretext to extinguish for all practical purposes the Institution, affecting everyone in the sector, instead of punish those responsible and reform the regulation to eliminate the problems of governance that encouraged you or made it possible for those bad practices”. “That has emerged from the crisis is a financial system that is worse than the one with which we started”, he maintained.

According to Quintás, the politicization led to the capture of the boxes. “The public authorities regional often elected their representatives in the organs of government and control by attending more to criteria of affinity politics that the competition for the position, although it is quite certain that not a few times the chosen proved to possess the qualities of professionalism-appropriate”. “It was frequent that the regional Governments will try to influence and guide decisions on functions that the boxes were not prepared, such as acting as public banks, and pushed them to waive loans given to political parties. The councils were unaware of the risk they would face as the granting of loans without adequate guarantees”, he shoots.