Cumulatively, the 2023 turnover of all Ligue 1 clubs has (finally) exceeded the mark of 2.4 billion euros, the amount that they should have generated in 2020 if Mediapro had been able to honor its commitments. The problem is that the mantra of leaders seems to be: “earn more to spend more.” In fact, they allocated 76% of their income to the envelope dedicated to salaries alone (1.8 billion euros). It is therefore not surprising that the total net result is negative: -€273 million, or -11%. Worse, 4 clubs including 3 of our representatives in Europe had a payroll greater than or equal to their turnover. It is logical then that the result of operations excluding transfers is degraded to the point of being comparable to domestic TV rights: -€656 million, or -27% of total revenue.
Faced with such an accounting drift, 3 solutions are available to clubs: either qualify and perform in a European Cup, if possible for the lucrative Champions League; either sell players, as expensively as possible… which a possible European route allows; or finally, appeal to its shareholder(s), as long as they have sufficient financial resources to assume such losses. Unfortunately, the European campaign of our clubs will have been disappointing sportingly and therefore economically: eliminations in the 8th of C1 for PSG (€101.3 million payout), in the group stage for OM (€51.5 million), in the 16th of the League Europa for AS Monaco (€18.3 million), the same for Stade Rennais (€11.4 million) as well as FC Nantes (€9.9 million), without forgetting the journey to the ¼ of the Europa League OGC Nice Conference (€8.8 million). In total, UEFA only accounts for 8.3% (€201.2 million) of the Ligue 1 economy.
As for the “transfer window” lever, the “League of Talents” has transformed into the “League of Buyers”: €900 million during the summer transfer window, more than the Bundesliga, Serie A and LaLiga. As for the winter transfer window, if 80 players left France for €101.05 million, 60 joined our championship for €198.3 million. For once, the biggest spending club was John Textor’s OL, releasing €55.88 million in order to relaunch itself in the race for Europe. To date, the entire L1 workforce is valued at 3.72 billion euros, or €600 million less than at the end of last season.
As for shareholders, the trend is now towards “retrenchment.” INEOS’s acquisition of a 27.7% stake in Manchester United casts doubt on the group’s involvement in OGC Nice. Still on the Coast, Dmitry Rybolovlev officially declared himself a seller of AS Monaco. And what can we say about the situation of the Girondins Bordeaux, a historic club in our championship whose “vital prognosis” seems a little more compromised every day, due to the lack of an owner capable of financing its return to the elite.
As a symbol of a form of downgrading in a world where multi-ownership projects are multiplying, the takeovers of ESTAC, RC Strasbourg and Toulouse FC would tend to confirm the status of a championship of “talent suppliers” more so many candidates for the final victory of the European games.
The paradox of the situation is that at a time when these 3 levers do not seem to be able to work in favor of our clubs, they are (finally) performing in Europe. Last week we still had a club involved in each of the UEFA cups. We can only hope that OM and PSG will reach the milestone of the ½ finals and thus increase the “Europe” share in the 2024 turnover, consolidate France’s place in the UEFA index and who knows, revive the interest of broadcasters for the TV rights of our beloved Ligue 1.