March 26, 1991 put an end to the military dictatorship of General Moussa Traoré. The man who was basically a lieutenant in the army had overthrown the young Republic of Mali in a coup d’état in 1968, before being ejected in turn by Lieutenant-Colonel Toumani Touré. After a period of transition, the latter established democracy, which lasted until it was overthrown by putschist soldiers in March 2012. After a transition, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta was elected President of the Republic in 2013 then re-elected in 2018 after a contested election, which resulted in the military coup of August 18, 2020, unanimously condemned by the international community and which caused the departure of French soldiers, present since 2013 as part of operations Serval then Barkhane aimed at fighting against groups jihadists in the north of the country.
Colonel of the Malian armed forces (FAMA) Assimi Goïta thus took power as transitional president of Mali. A transition that lasts… 30 years to the day after the fall of the dictator Traoré, it should have officially reached its end this Tuesday, but the military coup leaders cling to power. Assimi Goïta had actually signed a presidential decree on June 6, 2022 which extended the duration of the Malian transition by twenty-four months, from March 26, 2022. While a “slight postponement” had been announced six months ago concerning the presidential election which was to be held last February, Bamako has not set any new date to date.
The duration of the transition period had been the subject of long discussions within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), but, since November 2022, Mali has left the regional organization. Members of the Malian opposition, who demand a return to democratic constitutional order, denounce a “hostage-taking” of the country for four years, recall our colleagues at RFI. “They are prolonging,” summarizes Antoine Glaser in Le Figaro about the transitional government. “It’s hot air,” this former journalist and expert on the African continent categorically states about a possible end to the “transition.”
On the side of the military junta in power, Hamman Touré, the president of Msat – an organization which supports the putschists -, quoted by RFI, encourages the extension of this transition, in the name of the terrorist threat which still weighs on Mali: ” They were given a mission. Let’s give them time to finish! They are governing well.” Then the Malian outbid: “Do you think that those who will come (who would be elected, Editor’s note) will not encounter the same problems? Who is better suited than a soldier for security, who?” For him, the end of the transition will come “when the territory is free and the security of the populations is in order”.
In reality, for the putschists, the issue at this stage is no longer the holding of the elections, according to Antoine Glaser, who assures that “Goïta and his soldiers are installed”. In addition to popular support, it is the game of alliances which risks determining the future of the transitional government, which has relied since the departure of French troops in 2022 on Moscow and Wagner’s mercenaries. “It was its Russian ally who allowed the transitional government to retake the north” of the country, long undermined by jihadist groups, but also by the desire for autonomy of the Tuaregs, believes Antoine Glaser. Enough to maintain, incidentally, the propaganda against the former French protector at the heart of the sovereignist discourse of the putschists since their coup d’état.
But Russia’s centrality doesn’t appeal to everyone. “The Russian presence in the North, in Kidal, poses a problem with the Algerians,” certifies the Africanist. An essential cog in the negotiations between the different parties, neighboring Algeria – although a historic ally of Moscow – has until now established itself as a strategic player in the region. But Algeria’s diplomatic decline has increased since Mali’s exit from the Algiers agreement on January 25, when it was signed in 2015 with the Tuareg rebels with the aim of stabilizing the Sahel. The Russians were able to take advantage of this, but tensions between Algiers, Bamako and Moscow persist. Last December, the ambassadors of Mali in Algiers and Algeria in Bamako were recalled by their respective authorities.
“But ultimately, Algeria is doing everything to renew more or less correct relations with the putschists” in the face of Russian roots in Malian soil and the relative stability of the transitional government, maintains Antoine Glaser. It is for example in this dynamic that the Algerian ambassador returned to Bamako on January 5.
From now on, what will the Malian transitional authorities do? Will they take the trouble to regularize this situation? Will the Constitutional Court rule on its own? Will the transitional military government continue as if nothing had happened or will a presidential election end up being organized, and under what conditions? ECOWAS must in any case meet on July 3 in Accra (Ghana) and will decide whether or not to maintain the sanctions that have weighed on Mali since January 9.