On 18 January was handed over the investigation whether Sweden should go ahead, sign and ratify the convention on the kärnvapenförbud which was adopted by the 122 member states of the UN by 2017. Enmansutredaren Lars-Erik Lundin recommends that ”the uk should not accede to or sign the convention in its current form”. But the inquiry has not contributed to the greater clarity which is essential for Sweden’s standpoint.
the Convention on the kärnvapenförbud adopted by the UN general assembly in 2017, aims to influence how governments think, act and cooperate in kärnvapenfrågor.
This stipulates that the nuclear-weapon states should negotiate on russia’s nuclear abolition. This has the nuclear weapon states have not done and not planning to do.
No realistic analysts believe that a nuclear-weapon-free world will occur in the near future. It is, therefore, to constantly remind of russia’s nuclear risks and expose the nuclear-weapon states for such pressure that they show earnest to refurbish the down. Nobel prize-winning Ican and a large number of grass-roots and professional organisations have contributed to this new opening in the work for nuclear disarmament.
nato countries, particularly the united states, has in strong terms advised against Sweden from access to the convention, while at the same time as emphatically claimed that this lacks all realpolitisk importance.
The goal conflicts that clearly exist between the positive intentions and the legal, technical and security complications will in the investigation into the background of the long list of objections, weaknesses and problems related to the convention. Signed in a report compiled at least 32 ones.
the Report shows that too many points are weakly substantiated. Four of them are already in Sweden explanation of vote, and most of the other is known in connection with the hearing, 2017.
Below, we take up these as for us, as well as for the investigator, appears as central.
1 ”the Convention has a non-inclusive approach, which prevents international nedrustningsförhandlingar.” To nuclear powers in the foreseeable future will not accede to the convention is known and foreseen long ago. But would Sweden at possibly access (and that ”a small minority”) to reduce their opportunities to contribute to the international work on disarmament?
the Experience of the Swedish participation in the nedrustningsförhandlingar points as soon as to the contrary. Respect for the Swedish knowledge and integrity even when we are in the ”minority interest” has been crucial. An example: When Sweden and a number of states demanded a provstoppsavtal in the early 1960s, claimed the united states and the Soviet union that this was impossible to achieve. Verifikationsinstrumenten was missing: the superpowers argued that it was impossible to negotiate an effective agreement.
Sweden successfully argued that such technology already existed and thus could be used (FOA were here to great help). We are confident that Sweden can continue to get a bridge-building role as a ”western country”, a member of the EU and a partner with Nato and at the same time the party of the convention.
2 the Convention’s relationship to the NPT. the Investigator indicates that the non-proliferation treaty (npt) the NPT would be undermined by the convention. But there is nothing in the convention itself, which is contrary to the NPT. The NPT deals with the more detailed ickespridningsmålet and by the so-called additional protocol is verifikationsbestämmelser that the convention does not have.
the Convention goes on the other side for longer than what the NPT does respect the prohibition of nuclear weapons, and such requirements should be discussed at the upcoming översynskonferenser. International expertise indicates that the convention becomes a means to strengthen the NPT (but not necessarily incumbent upon nuclear position). The two conventions can mutually strengthen each other.
3 Kärnvapenparaplyer. If these writes investigator: ”A Swedish access would not at least because of the ’paraplyförbudet’, understood as a fundamental critique of the geopolitical doctrine that covered almost all of Sweden’s neighbours and partners in Europe and north America in the Nato.”
That the convention means that the parties to the contract takes away from the Nato kärnvapendoktrin and that states be under the kärnvapenmakters kärnvapenparaplyer is one of the starting points. Sweden is already opposed to the long-term safety can be created through this deterrence and should not change on this point.
4 Question about Nato and Sweden. the Investigator writes that the consequences of a Swedish accession would be ”very negative” with regard to the Swedish defence cooperation with Nato, nato countries, and Finland. But to support the position claimed only the ”signals” from the united states, certain other nuclear-weapon states and some Nato allies.
Here, had a thorough analysis been in the highest degree desirable. Such would possibly been able to explain the paradoxical fact that nato countries, particularly the united states, in strong terms advised against Sweden from access to the convention, while at the same time as emphatically claimed that this lacks all realpolitisk importance. Both Sweden and Nato have stressed the mutual benefits of cooperation. It is unlikely that the alliance or its members would endanger this collaboration if Sweden joins the convention. Exercises and other forms of cooperation shall not include nuclear weapons.
We believe also in the likeness of the investigation that there are weaknesses in the text of the convention and should be strengthened on several points. But there are good opportunities to influence the convention in a positive direction.
The solution we find best for our country is to sign and ratify the convention, and then as the state vigorously promote its improvement, and to other countries will gradually join. It would be extremely strange if close to 60 years of Swedish diplomatis proudest efforts against weapons of mass destruction would not be completed.
If the parties in the government and parliament, the need for additional lighting of the questions, this should of course be respected. In both cases, we see it as necessary to the work and analyses done in full transparency, in cooperation with ”like-minded” countries and with the use of the best possible Swedish and foreign expertise.
