the Venezuelan government oljemonopol PDVSA, once the country’s pride and treasure, today is a rusty wreck with the acute shortage of spare parts and engineers. The country exports soon not more than half as much oil as in 2007.
Tasks: the Russian military on the way to Venezuela
at the same time as the relations to the united states devastated so has the dependence to the united states increased dramatically. It depends on the venezuelan oil’s viscous nature: the Spanish conquerors, tarred their ships with it. It can not be pumped into the tankers until it is mixed with a lighter variant. Every day exporting country a half a million barrels to the US and import one hundred thousand barrels of light oil from the united states in order to dilute it.
are sent to China every day, but it has the venezuelan regime no joy of because this oil is installment payment on the loan. Oil to the united states is by far the most important income for the regime, and it is not easy to find alternative customers, because few have the infrastructure needed to handle Venezuelan oil.
Erik de la Reguera: the Country is at risk of being drawn into international conflicts
Far from what the Maduro regime claims, so it is the USA’s republicans, mainly politicians from the states along the gulf of mexico where the oil is refined, which avstyrt sanctions against PDVSA.
the journal Spectator that ”the naturrikaste countries are often those where you live, is the worst”. Our times have given abundant confirmation of this. Fabulous wealth in countries with weak institutions and corrupt politics often end up with chaos, environmental disasters and financial ruin. Nigeria, Angola, Zaire, and Ecuador are some examples.
the Venezuelan oil revenue tumbled about the country culturally and economically, and the income gap increased, but all did it better. In the spring of 1959, during a secret meeting at the Cairo yacht club, persuaded the Venezuelan energy minister Pérez Alonso saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq and Kuweit to establish an oil cartel, OPEC.
After the oil crises of the 1970s was the OPEC countries ‘ revenues copious. PDVSA started buying up oil companies in other countries. In 1986 they bought into Citgo in Oklahoma, one of AMERICA’s great energy companies, with three refineries, fourteen thousand gas stations, and more than twenty percent of the U.S. gasoline market.
which , today, gives the Maduro regime to a revenue, at the same time an achilles ‘ heel, because it can be confiscated. Citgo donated a half-million dollars to Donald Trump’s installation party, but even so, explained recently, the united states Citgos manager Asdrubal Chavez – cousin of former president Hugo Chávez – not desirable.
During a long strike in 2002-2003 tried to PDVSA trap Hugo Chávez regime. Chávez kicked 18.000 oljeanställda – close to half of the workforce – and took control of the company. Paradoxically, this political victory for Chávez the beginning of the end for the company.
Photo: Drew Angerer
and interference from the state authorities and the committee on budgets caused Chávez’s PDVSA to take over more and more social and ”revolutionary” features. These so-called ”missions” acted in shanty towns and fattigkvarter and carrying out social activities in which the benefits were often linked to political loyalty. One of the projects that oljemonopolet now had on his lot was the Mision Mercal, which established 16.000 discount stores with 85 000 employees.
This, and dozens of other missions became a millstone around the neck of PDVSA, whose revenues even at the best of times – with oil revenue in the hundreds of millions of dollars a day – enough for some new investments.
In all of these missions were gradually more and more people whose only qualifications were related – and partiband to the regime. The waste and försnillningen broke the world record, the regime began to print paper money, borrow billions from China and the sell of its gold reserve. Since the united states last year, forbade their citizens to trade with venezolanskt gold, Turkey has become an increasingly important trading partner.
gave Hugo Chávez the feeling that he could bend the economy where he wanted. The farm collectivization, led by cuban ”experts”, made the country dependent on the matimport on a large scale from Brazil and Colombia.
But in the Cáracas took it with the ro, there was the money. But several years ago, there’s no money, and the phrase ”la maldición petrolera”, the oil curse, it occurs more and more often in the unhappy country’s polarized debate.
